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Collective choice is a sub-domain of decision 
analysis (a discipline comprising the philosophy, 
theory, methodology, and professional practice 
necessary to address important decisions in formal 
manner according to Wikipedia) that addresses 
decision making problems where a certain number 
of decision makers must select a subset (possibly 
reduced to a singleton) of alternatives from a large 
set of potential alternatives in order to achieve some 
collective as well as individual objectives, prefer-
ences, or desires. Such decision making problems 
are encountered in many practical situations such 
as management, engineering, economics, social, 
politics etc., see for instance (Bouyssou et al., 
2000), Steuer (1986), and references therein for 
some real world applications even though in these 
references the problems are most of the time 
treated as a single decision maker problems. The 
existence of many decision makers necessitates to 
have a coordination mechanism (how to aggregate 
the view points of all decision makers) to address 
collective choice problems. The purpose of this 
chapter is to address such coordination mechanism. 
Using bipolar analysis that consists in evaluating 
alternatives by two opposite measures (a measure 
gathering positive aspects of the alternative and 
that resuming its negative aspects) with regard 
to pursued objectives at individual level as well 
as at community level permits in some extent to 
embed human attitude into the decision process.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as 
follows. In the second section a background on 
(collective) choice problems resolution methods 
will be recalled; then the main focus of this 
chapter will be presented in third section; 
section four will be dedicated to the main 
contribution of 
this chapter: bipolar framework for modeling and 
solving collective choice problem; section five 
presents a sketch of future directions researches; 
a conclusion is presented in section six and finally 
references, additional reading, and some keys 
terms and definitions end the chapter.
??????????
In political science, methods for realizing a col-
lective choice (mapping individual preferences 
onto collective preferences) are dominated since 
the advent of democracy by simple majority vot-
ing process (Picavet, 1996). But many theoretical 
results such as that of Borda, see (Borda, 1781), 
Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1951) 
show that this way of aggregating individuals 
preferences can lead to inconsistency. In deci-
sion analysis, that actually does have many steps 
such as formulating decision goal or objectives, 
identifying attributes that characterize potential 
alternatives that can respond to the decision goal 
and making recommendation regarding these 
alternatives given the decision goal, choice is the 
final step. But to choose, one must evaluate first; 
the construction of an evaluation procedure, often 
carried up by an expert known in the literature as 
the analyst (Bouyssou et al., 2000) is an important 
step in the decision process; this step is the main 
purpose of this chapter. This construction consists 
in aggregating individual preferences, understood 
in a broad sense to obtain a way that permits to 
rank, at least partially, different potential alter-
natives. Classically, two main approaches have 
dominated evaluation process in modern decision 
analysis: value or utility type approach (a value 
function or an utility measure is derived for each 
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??alternative to represent its adequacy with decision goal), see for instance Steuer (1986) and Saaty 
(1980); outranking methods (a pair comparison 
of alternatives is carried up under each attribute 
or criteria to derive a pre-order over the alterna-
tives set), see (Bouyssou et al., 2000), (Brans 
et al., 1986, 1986a). The approach that will be 
described in this chapter can be considered as 
an intermediate one compared to those two ap-
proaches evoked previously; indeed by using 
numerical values to evaluate alternatives look 
like utility type approach, but as two “opposite” 
measures are used, it permits incomparability as 
it is the case in outranking approaches.
?????????????????? ??????
In many situations, collective decision making is 
made through a majority voting process where 
each decision maker casts a ballot for only one 
alternative and the alternative that obtains the 
maximum of voices is considered as the commu-
nity choice. But voting process does not capture 
in our opinion all attitudes of human beings such 
as ambiguity, indecision, social values consid-
eration, etc. Indeed, decision makers often face 
uncertainties (impossibility of decision makers to 
clearly express their objectives, to elicit and assess 
attributes, etc.) and interactions (a decision maker 
may be influenced by other decision makers when 
expressing his or her judgment). Furthermore, 
French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda 
and other have noticed since 18th century that 
in an election where the winner is the candidate 
who got the majority of votes and where there are 
more than 3 candidates, candidate who obtains the 
majority of voices is not necessarily the preferred 
one by the majority of voters. In this chapter we 
adopt an approach that highlights bipolarity no-
tion between all components of collective decision 
analysis problem. We are motivated by the fact 
that cognitive psychologists have observed for 
long time that human evaluate alternatives by 
considering separately their positive aspects and 
their negative aspects, see for instance (Caciopo 
& Berntson, 1994) and (Osgood et al., 1957). To 
this end, we introduce supporting and rejecting 
notions (Tchangani, 2010) that relate attributes to 
objectives leading to an evaluation model in terms 
of two measures or indices (selectability and reject-
ability) for each alternative in the framework of 
satisficing game theory (Stirling, 2003) so that a 
decision maker can be in position of not being able 
to discriminate between two alternatives. These 
notions permit to partition attributes set into three 
subsets given an objective: attributes that support 
this objective, attributes that reject this objective 
and attributes that are neutral with regard to this 
objective; of course only supporting and rejecting 
attributes are interesting for evaluation process. 
Selecting and rejecting degrees of an attribute 
with regard to an objective may be assessed us-
ing known techniques such as analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP), see (Saaty, 1980) or any method 
that could assign a measure to an attribute with 
regard to a pair of objective and alternative. This 
model allows alternatives to be characterized by 
heterogeneous attributes (at individual level) and 
possibly different attributes from an individual to 
another; it allows also incomparability between 
alternatives in terms of Pareto-equilibrium, see 
(Pareto, 1896). Collective decision making situa-
tions with such issues are pervasive in real world 
applications; for instance a government evaluating 
projects that belong to different domains such as 
health, infrastructures, social, economics, etc. with 
the main objective to enhance a country develop-
ing process (Tchangani, 2015). In such situations, 
though attributes characterizing projects may be 
completely different, the important thing is their 
adequacy with regards to the pursued objectives, 
so that alternative projects can be ultimately com-
pared on the same basis (decision maker’ desires). 
The social influence between decision makers and 
decision makers’ attitude will be taken into account 
through different degrees such as concordance/
discordance degrees within the group, selfishness 
degree, risk averse degree, see (Tchangani, 2014). 
When making decision in complex situation, it 
is rather rare that a human reach a final decision 
without hesitation; most of the time there exist 
some dubitative attitude, some indecision between 
several possible alternative decisions; this attitude 
is carried up in this chapter through satisficing 
game (Stirling, 2003).
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Formerly, collective choice problem is described 
by following elements: a set U of potential alter-
natives from which an alternative or a subset of 
alternatives must be selected by a group of deci-
sion makers; a generic decision maker is desig-
nated by i and a generic alternative by u (u U∈ ). 
In the bipolar analysis framework, evaluation 
process consists in determining for each alterna-
tive u U∈ ?  two measures known as satisfiabil-
ity measures: namely a selectability measure 
denoted µ
S
i
u( )  derived by decision maker i or 
µ
S
u( )  derived by the community of decision 
makers or stakeholders and a rejectability measure 
denoted by µ
R
i
u( )derived by decision maker i or 
µ
R
u( )  derived by the community. The modeling 
process adopted in this chapter goes from indi-
vidual to global, global satisfiability measures 
µ
S
u( )  and µ
R
u( )  will be obtained by aggregating 
individual satisfiability measures µ
S
i
u( ) and 
µ
R
i
u( )  over all decision makers. Locally each 
decision maker i may wish to satisfy own objec-
tives or desires; to this end he or she will use a 
set of features, criteria or attributes to evaluate 
the adequacy of an alternative with regard to his 
or her objectives; these sets may be common to 
all actors for some particular choice problems but 
it is not an obligation for the choice procedure 
being developed in this chapter. We propose to 
elicit satisfiability measures in two steps: firstly, 
each decision maker i will derive its categorical 
(that is without taking into account the existence 
of other members) satisfiability measures µ
S
i
u
0 ( )
and µ
R
i
u
0 ( )  for each alternative u U∈ using 
BOCR analysis for instance. The convergence of 
supporting/rejecting notions and uncertainty leads 
to an analysis framework known as BOCR analy-
sis, see (Tchangani, 2010; Tchangani, 2015) that 
may constitute an interesting alternative method 
for elicitation and evaluation. In this framework 
the set of attributes characterizing an alternative 
with regards to an objective is divided into four 
subsets: benefit subset (B) (certain attributes of 
alternative that support the objective); opportu-
nity subset (O) (uncertain attributes of alternative 
that support the objective); cost subset (C) (certain 
attributes of alternative that reject the objective); 
and risk subset (R) (uncertain attributes of alter-
native that reject the objective). Final evaluation 
of alternative u with regards to objective o will 
be obtained by aggregating separately positive 
aspects in terms of benefit and opportunity and 
negative aspects in terms of cost and risk to mea-
sure how well is this alternative with regard to 
that objective and opposite forces in the realization 
of that objective by this alternative respectively. 
Let us denote by b u
k
o( ) , o u
k
o( ) , c u
k
o( )  and r u
k
o( )  
the normalized values of benefit, opportunity, cost 
and risk attribute k of alternative u with regard to 
objective o; and by b uo( ) , o uo( ) , c uo( ) , and 
r u
o( )  vectors gathering these normalized benefit, 
opportunity, cost and risk measures respectively. 
Let suppose that decision maker is able to supply 
for these components normalized relative degrees 
vectors in terms of ω? , ω? , ω? , and ω? ; then the 
overall benefit, opportunity, cost, and risk mea-
sures of alternative u for objective o are obtained 
by aggregating over the corresponding attributes 
set using Choquet integral associated to a weight-
ed cardinal fuzzy measure for instance, see 
(Tchangani, 2014), as shown by the expressions 
of Table 1.
In Table 1, C xwcfm
ω ( )  stands for Choquet in-
tegral of numerical vector ?  associated to a 
weighted cardinal fuzzy measure with relative 
importance weights vector ω  of elements to ag-
gregate, see Table 2 and (Tchangani, 2013).
Indeed, given the synergy created by grouping 
attributes by category, Choquet integral with a 
weighted cardinal fuzzy measure is well suited as 
an aggregation operator. Let us denote by b u( ) , 
c u( ) , c u( ) and r u( )  vectors gathering benefit, 
opportunity, cost and risk measures with regard 
to all objectives and by ω? , the relative importance 
vector of objectives then the overall opinion re-
garding the alternative u is captured by the ben-
efit measure B u( ) , opportunity measure O u( ) , 
cost measure C u( ) , and risk measure R u( )  will 
be obtained similarly by aggregation as shown in 
Table 3.
Categorical selectability measure µ
S
i
u
0 ( )  and 
categorical rejectability measure µ
R
i
u
0 ( )  of alter-
native u in the point of view of decision maker i 
are finally obtained by normalizing over the al-
ternatives set U, the measures
φ φ
i i
B u O u( ) ( )+ −( )1
and
1−( ) +φ φ
i i
C u R u( ) ( ) , 
as shown by expressions of Table 4, see (Tchan-
gani, 2014).
Parameter 0 1≤ ≤φ?  in Table 4 can be in-
terpreted as the risk averse index of actor i; indeed, 
this index permits to adjust the attitude of a deci-
sion maker toward uncertainty; for instance a risk 
averse decision maker, for who φ? → ? , will bal-
ance immediate benefit (B) with potential harm 
(R) regardless of potential benefit (O) and im-
mediate cost to pay (C).
In collective decision analysis situation, there 
is always some conditionality in the sense that the 
preferences of a given decision maker may be 
conditioned to that of other decision makers be-
cause when making decision, a decision maker 
may be influenced by its social vicinity posi-
tively or negatively. Indeed, influence does not 
mean positive perception (altruism, deference) of 
Table 1. BOCR components for objective o
B u C b u
o wcfm o
b
( ) ( )= ( )ω
O u C o u
o wcfm o
o
( ) ( )= ( )ω
C u C c u
o wcfm o
c
( ) ( )= ( )ω
R u C r u
o wcfm o
r
( ) ( )= ( )ω
Table 2. Choquet integral associated to a weighted cardinal fuzzy measure
Given a n dimension numerical valued vector ?  and a relative importance vector ω  of the elements of ? , the Choquet integral 
C x
wcfm
ω ( )  of ?  associated to a weighted cardinal fuzzy measure with relative importance vector ω  is given by
C x
n k
n
wcfm
j
j A
k
ω
ω( )=
− −

















∈
∑
( )1








−( )














−
=
∑ x xk k
k
n
σ σ( ) ( )1
1
where σ  is a permutation over the elements of ?  given by:
x x x and by convention x
nσ σ σ σ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
...
1 2 0
0≤ ≤ ≤ =
and A
k
 is defined by:
A k k n
k
= +{ }σ σ σ( ), ( ), ..., ( )1
the influenced decision maker toward influencing 
one; it may represent repulsion or aggressiveness. 
One can admit that if two decision makers are in 
discordance then the conditioned selectability of 
one should be proportional to the categorical 
rejectability of the other and in the case they are 
in concordance it must be proportional to the 
categorical selectability of the other decision 
maker; a similar observation holds for the reject-
ability, see (Tchangani, 2014). So let denote by 
µ
S V i
i
/ ( )
 and µ
R V i
i
/ ( )
 the conditional selectability 
and rejectability of decision maker i given his 
position with regard to his social vicinity (V(i)) 
and by µ
S
V i
u
( )
( )0  and µ
R
V i
u
( )
( )0  the vector of cat-
egorical selectability measures and rejectability 
measures of all member of social vicinity of this 
decision maker. The measures µ
S V i
i
u
/ ( )
( )  and 
µ
R V i
i
u
/ ( )
( )  are therefore obtained by aggregation 
of categorical satisfiability measures and normal-
ization as given in Table 5.
In expressions given in Table 5, the attitude 
of decision makers is taken into account with 
regard to his/her vicinity through relative concor-
dance weights vector ω
i
c  and discordance weights 
vector ω
i
d ; see (Tchangani, 2014). Weighting 
parameter 0 1≤ ≤γ?  can be interpreted as the 
altruist degree of decision maker i; indeed, γ? → ?
means the total altruist behavior of decision 
maker i as he does not consider the contribution 
of his discordance attitude in the formation of his 
conditional satisfiability measures whereas 
γ? → ?  corresponds to the case where decision 
maker i behaves aggressively as he considers only 
his discordance attitude about the opinions of the 
members of his vicinity.
The ultimate selectability measure µ
S
i
u( )  and 
rejectability measure µ
R
i
u( )of the alternative u
in the opinion of decision maker i are corrected 
as shown by expressions of Table 6 where 
0 1≤ ≤δ?  is the selfishness degree of decision 
maker i.
Final choice procedures will be derived from 
the ultimate and individual satisfiability measures; 
basically two main procedures may guide how to 
reach a collective choice: reasoning from an “ag-
Table 3. BOCR components for alternative u
B u C b u
o
wcfm( ) ( )= ( )
ω
 ; O u C o u
o
wcfm( ) ( )= ( )
ω
C u C c u
o
wcfm( ) ( )= ( )
ω
 ; R u C r u
o
wcfm( ) ( )= ( )
ω
Table 4. Categorical satisfiability measures
µ
φ φ
φ φ
S
i i
i iv U
i
u
B u O u
B v O v
0
1
1
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
=
+ −( )
+ −( ){ }
∈∑
µ
φ φ
φ φ
R
i i
i iv U
i
u
C u R u
C v R v
0
1
1
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
=
−( ) +
−( ) +{ }
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Table 5. Conditional satisfiability measures
µ
γ µ γ µ
ω ω
S V i
i
wcfm
S i
wcfm
R
i
i
c
V i i
d
V i
u
C u C u
/ ( )
( )
( ) (
( ) ( )
=
( )+ −( )0 01 )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )+ −( ) ( ){ }∈ γ µ γ µω ωi wcfm S i wcfm Rv U C v C v
i
c
V i i
d
V i
0 01∑
µ
γ µ γ µ
ω ω
R V i
i
wcfm
R i
wcfm
S
i
i
c
V i i
d
V i
u
C u C u
/ ( )
( )
( ) (
( ) ( )
=
( )+ −( )0 01 )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )+ −( ) ( ){ }∈ γ µ γ µω ωi wcfm R i wcfm Sv U C v C v
i
c
V i i
d
V i
0 01∑
??
gregation” of individual satisfiability measures or 
from individual short lists obtained locally using 
individual procedures.
???????????????????
Given the idea of going from individual prefer-
ences to community preferences considered here, 
to reach a community level solution one can 
consider two possibilities: obtaining an aggre-
gated satisfiability measures and then analyzing 
the selection problem as a single decision maker 
problem, or obtaining short lists of local satisfic-
ing equilibrium alternatives and then trying to 
converge to a community satisficing alternative(s).
??????????????????????????
?????????????????
Let denote by µ
S
u( )  and µ
R
u( )  the aggregated 
selectability and aggregated rejectability measures 
of alternative u obtained from individual measures 
of all decision makers. Arguing that selected or 
rejected alternative by two decision makers is 
sounder than selected or rejected alternative by 
one decision maker appeals for a synergetic ag-
gregation scheme such as Choquet integral con-
sidered in previous sections. Once these measures 
are obtained, the analysis process in order to reach 
a final decision can rely on indicators built upon 
a value function
pi υ µ µ( ) ( ), ( )u u u
R S
= ( )
such as: maximum discriminant,
pi µ µ( ) ( ) ( )u u q u
S R
= − ; 
maximum boldness, pi
µ
µ
( )
( )
( )
u
u
u
S
R
=  ; maximum 
selectability index or minimum rejectability index, 
pi µ( ) ( )u u
S
=  or pi
µ
( )
( )
u
u
R
=
1
 respectively.
???????????????????????????????
Instead of aggregating individual satisfiability 
measures to reason on a single decision maker 
basis, one may consider that each decision maker 
i comes with his own selected subset of satisficing 
equilibrium alternatives ?
q
i
 obtained by balanc-
ing his selectability and rejectability measures up 
to a caution or boldness index q
i
 (Tchangani, 
2014). If it happens that a common alternative 
belong to all subsets, it constitutes the consensus 
alternative and the choice problem is solved. But 
this will constitute an exceptional situation and 
in most cases, local best alternatives will differ 
from one decision maker to another so that an 
adequate mechanism is needed to reach a final 
decision. In this case, one possibility is to define 
a score υ( )?  over these individual selected subsets; 
some possible such scores are given in Table 7 
where ?
Ω
 is the indicator of the set Ω  given by
1
1
0Ω
Ω
( )x
if x
if not
=
∈






Table 6. Individual satisfiability measures
µ δ µ δ µ
S i S i S V i
i i i
u u u( ) ( ) ( )
/ ( )
= + −( )0 1
µ δ µ δ µ
R i R i R V i
i i i
u u u( ) ( ) ( )
/ ( )
= + −( )0 1
Table 7. Global score for alternatives
υ
µ
µ
( )
( )
( )
u
u
u
S
R
i
n
i
i
=














=∏ 1
or 
υ( ) ( )u u
q
iqi
u
= { }∈∑ 1ΣΣ
It may happen (for sake of simplicity for in-
stance) that decision makers be disposed to choos-
ing by a voting process; this case is considered in 
the following subsection.
?????????????????????????????????
Choice by voting generally consists in a simple 
procedure where each decision maker gives his 
voice to only one alternative and at the end the 
alternative that obtains the maximum of voices 
will be declared the winner. But this procedure 
does have some limitations; indeed, in his paper 
entitled « Sur les élections au scrutin» published 
in 1781 in « Mémoires de l’Académie Royale », 
see (Borda, 1781), the French mathematician 
Jean-Charles de Borda has shown that, in a major-
ity election where there are more than 3 candidates, 
candidate who obtains the majority of voices is 
not necessarily the preferred one by the majority 
of voters. To overcome this situation, he proposed 
to choose the elected candidate using a merit 
order: each voter will rank candidates according 
to his preference by assigning, if there are m 
candidates, the score m to the most preferred 
candidate, the score m-1 to next most preferred 
and so on until the score 1 to the last preferred 
candidate. So if there are n voters and denoting 
by ω
i
j( )  the score assigned to candidate j by 
voter i, then the global score or merit ω( )?  of 
candidate j is obtained by adding all of its scores 
as given by the expression ω ω( ) ( )j j
i
i
n
=
=
∑
1
 and 
the elected candidate will be that who got the most 
important merit score.
But in practice, for a given candidate, a par-
ticular voter may have positive opinion for some 
aspects of that candidate and negative opinion for 
other aspects. So Borda’s voting procedure means 
that each voter must do a balance of his opinions 
(positive and negative) in order to obtain a sort 
of global merit score for each candidate before 
voting. But it is well known that it is easier to 
aggregate homogeneous aspects (positive for 
instance) than heterogeneous aspects (combining 
positive and negative aspects simultaneously). So 
we propose, building on the bipolar notion, a vot-
ing process according to the following scheme: 
voter i will rank all candidates according to their 
positive aspects in his opinion to obtain a global 
positive merit score ω
i
P j( )  for candidate j and 
then rank them according to their negative aspects 
to obtain a global negative merit score ω
i
N j( ) . 
The final choice process can be done using two 
different procedures: selection from individual 
choice (a global merit score ω(j) for candidate j 
is obtained similar to expressions of Table 7) and 
selection from aggregated scores (voters opinions 
are aggregated separately to obtain for a given 
candidate j, a global positive merit score ωP j( )  
and a global negative merit score ωN j( )  and then 
obtain the global score by balancing ωP j( )  and 
ωN j( ) ).
Decision regarding which procedure must be 
used in a particular case, how to aggregate posi-
tive and negative opinions separately as well as 
how to make trade-off between such aggregated 
opinions, are upper level and law oriented issues 
that regulate life in community such as a constitu-
tion in democratic nations.
??????????????????????????
Decision making approach described in this 
chapter falls into soft computing paradigm. If 
bipolar approach presented in this chapter permits 
to reach possibly robust solution, there remains, 
nevertheless, possible improvements regarding 
methodologies and modeling tools in order to 
reach usability of this framework in solving real 
world complex problems. Here are some possible 
improvements directions.
• Context: How decision makers and/or ex-
perts view positive and negative aspects of 
an alternative on one hand and their atti-
tude towards risk on other hand may de-
pend on their personal situation as well as 
??the behavior of decision environment that we refer to as the context. Indeed, prefer-
ences depend upon psychological attri-
butes of the person who judges; therefore 
to dispose of a framework that is as close 
as possible to human way of deciding, this 
context component should be considered 
in modeling stage.
• Dynamics: As the context sensitive con-
sideration mentioned above, attitude of 
decision makers and/or experts may vary 
from one instant to another so that a same 
problem may be viewed differently by the 
same decision maker from an instant to an-
other. This dynamicity should be consid-
ered in the modeling process to allow pa-
rameters variation at each instant; mainly 
if a computer assisted tool to support the 
decision process must be developed.
• Sensitivity Analysis: Considering context 
and actors psychological attributes and in-
teractions appeal for developing a way to 
do a sensitivity analysis with regards to 
these parameters. This sensitivity analysis 
may result in realizing scenarios analysis 
and answering questions like “what if?”
and/or “is it possible?”.
??????????
Collective choice problem as a decision making 
problem where possibly antagonistic preferences 
of many actors or stakeholders have to be taken into 
account is considered in this chapter. Indeed, the 
main purpose of this chapter has been to propose 
a modeling process of collective choice that cope 
as much as possible with individual behavior in 
early stages of the decision process, collectivity 
issues being postponed as much as possible in 
later stages. The proposed approach of this chapter 
relies on the cardinal concept or notion of bipolar-
ity at the individual as well as community level. 
This concept consists in evaluating (individually 
or collectively) each potential alternative or can-
didate by two measures: a measure that reflects 
positive aspects of the considered alternative and 
a measure that gathers its negative impacts with 
regard to the pursued goal(s). It has also been 
shown that even classical choice using voting (by 
merit as proposed in 18th century by Borda) process 
can be formulated in this framework to integrate 
individual preferences as much as possibly into 
the community choice process.
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Aggregation: A process that permit to go 
from data represented in a high dimension set 
to a representation in a set of low and compact 
dimension.
Bipolarity: A notion that consists, for an actor, 
in viewing or evaluating anything in two direc-
tions: a direction positively seen by the actor and 
a direction considered to impede his aspirations.
BOCR Analysis: A framework of decision 
analysis where potential actions, options, deci-
??sions, or alternatives are evaluated through four indicators: benefit (B), their certain or immedi-
ate positive contribution to decision goal; their 
opportunity (O), the positive uncertain or long 
term contribution; cost (C) that summarizes their 
immediate or certain aspects that work against the 
achievement of decision goal; and risk (R), an 
indicator that aggregates uncertain or long term 
potential threats.
Collective Choice: A decision making prob-
lem where a certain numbers of actors, decision 
makers, stakeholders or players must choose a 
subset (possibly reduced to a singleton) of alterna-
tives or actions among a large number of potential 
actions or alternatives in order to achieve some 
collective as well as individual objectives.
Coordination Mechanism: Process by which 
the views points of many decision makers are ag-
gregated to address collective choice problems.
Majority Voting: A coordination mechanism 
in collective choice where each decision maker 
must pronounce himself over a single alternative 
and the alternative that obtains the maximum 
voices win.
Rejecting: A notion to express the fact that 
behavior of something (attribute for instance) is 
negatively correlated with that of another thing 
(objective for instance).
Satisficing Game: A decision analysis frame-
work where each action or alternatives is evalu-
ated over two measures or degrees: a selectability 
measure that works towards the achievement of 
decision maker goal and the rejectability measure 
that constitutes the cost, in a broad sense, to pay 
to achieve the goal.
Supporting: A notion to express the fact that 
behavior of something (attribute for instance) is 
positively correlated with that of another thing 
(objective for instance).
